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Submission 
 
The submission broadly supports accession to and implementation of the Convention, 
taking the text of it as given. This submission addresses: 
1. General issues concerning accession to and implementation of the Convention; and 
2. Questions 1-6 in the Judgments Project Consultation Paper.  
 
We make no submission on the general question of the inclusion of intellectual property 
judgments in the Convention, and do not address Questions 7-10.  
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General submissions: accession and implementation 
 
1. General submission 
 
Assuming that the Convention is adopted by a diplomatic session of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, we submit that Australia should accede 
to and implement that Convention.    
 
The reasons for our support for the draft Convention are set out in the rest of this 
Submission. 
 
2. Form of implementation 
 
We submit that, if Australia were to implement the draft Convention – 
 The legislative structure should be the simplest that is possible to 
incorporate both the provisions of the Convention and the bilateral 
agreements that are currently given effect in the Foreign Judgments Act 
1991 (Cth); and 
 The enforcement of a judgment that is recognised under Article 5 or 6 of 
the draft Convention should take place by registration.              
 
Australia currently has schemes for the recognition and enforcement of cross-border 
judgments under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) and the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) (‘FJA’) – as well as 
allowing enforcement at common law when foreign judgments are not captured by any of 
these statutes.  In implementing the Convention, we submit that any additional and 
unnecessary complexity should be avoided.  The Service and Execution of Process Act and 
the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act set up a scheme of a different kind: they are ‘double 
conventions’ that deal with both adjudicative jurisdiction (ie, the power to judge) and 
enforcement jurisdiction (ie, the ability to enforce).  So far as the jurisdiction of the court 
of origin is concerned, these two statutes give common rules and principles of adjudicative 
jurisdiction and the right of courts to render judgment is not challengeable at the point of 
enforcement in the requested State.  These are schemes of ‘direct jurisdiction’, and should 
remain unaffected by the implementation of the Convention.   
 
In contrast, the FJA and the draft Convention are both schemes of ‘indirect jurisdiction’ 
where, by the law of the requested State, the entitlement of the court of origin to render 
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judgment is challengeable in the requested State.  It is for the Attorney-General’s 
Department to determine the best legislative form for implementing the Convention.  We 
are therefore indifferent to whether the Convention should be added to the FJA, or 
implemented through a new International Civil Law Act or some other legislative structure.  
However, we believe that it is best to minimise the number of statutes that deal with the 
enforcement of foreign judgments so as also to reduce the risk of confusion.  It would be 
unfortunate if it were necessary to know which statute applies to which foreign country’s 
judgments before consulting the relevant statute. 1  In whatever legislative form the 
Convention is to be implemented, we therefore submit that the terms of the Convention 
and of the FJA are included in the one statute.  This would mean that differences in the 
jurisdictional bases for recognition and enforcement under the Convention and the existing 
provisions of the FJA must be made explicit.2  
 
To fulfil the Convention’s aims of predictability and efficiency, we submit that enforcement 
in Australia should take place by the standard registration procedure that is already used 
in the Service and Execution of Process Act, the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act and the 
FJA.  The draft Convention allows this [Article 14(1)], and can be made compatible with 
the production of documents that are required by Article 13. It is a procedure that 
eliminates the need for litigation to enforce a judgment that has already emerged from 
litigation, and the need again to establish adjudicative jurisdiction over the judgment 
debtor.  Naturally, we would expect that recognition of a judgment in Australia did not 
require registration, and that as long as a judgment qualified for recognition under Article 
5 or 6, it could be pleaded as a defence or counterclaim in legal proceedings without the 
need for separate registration.3  The grounds on which enforcement may be refused in 
Article 7 would therefore have to be raised in separate proceedings to set aside 
registration.4   
 
3. New Zealand 
 
We submit that, if Australia were to accede to the draft Convention, it declare 
that the Convention does not apply to judgments made by New Zealand courts.   
                                                     
1 We have in mind the confusing position in the United Kingdom where, in addition to the residue of 
common law enforcement, at least four very different legislative instruments apply to civil and 
commercial judgments: the Administration of Justice Act 1920 (UK), the Foreign Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (UK), the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (UK) and the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation (EU).  A statute book like this should be avoided.     
2 The jurisdictional bases in the draft Convention are both general [Article 5(1)(a)-(h), (m)] and 
specific [Article 5(1)(i)-(l)], compared with the general split between in personam and in rem 
judgments in the FJA: See Table 1. 
3 See the comparable effect of recognition in the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 12(1). 
4 Cf Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 7(1). 
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Together, the Service and Execution of Process Act, the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-
vesting) Acts and the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act create a scheme by which:  
 
(a) Initiating process of any federal state, territory or New Zealand court circulates 
freely (ie may be served) anywhere in the Tasman world (ie Australia and New 
Zealand); 
(b) The exercise of jurisdiction by any federal state, territory or New Zealand court 
is coordinated by either the transfer or stay of proceedings in favour of the 
appropriate court or the court exclusively chosen by the parties; and 
(c) The judgment of any federal state, territory or New Zealand court circulates 
freely anywhere in the Tasman world, except that a New Zealand judgment 
may be resisted in Australia on the ground of public policy and vice versa. 
 
As a result of the treaty between Australia and New Zealand on civil jurisdiction and 
judgments – the Christchurch Agreement5 – the effective inclusion of New Zealand in the 
intra-Australian scheme on civil jurisdiction and judgments is an acknowledgement of 
‘each Party’s confidence in the judicial and regulatory institutions of the other Party’ and 
a ‘shared commitment to effective resolution of trans-Tasman civil disputes and increased 
regulatory cooperation’. 6   Implemented by the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, this 
arrangement ensures that New Zealand judgments circulate more freely in Australia than 
other foreign judgments.  It is a much more efficient means of enforcing cross-border 
judgments than the scheme set out in the draft Convention, and we submit that it should 
not be compromised by implementation of the Convention.  
 
Although the operation of the Service and Execution of Process Act and the cross-vesting 
scheme may remain unaffected by the Convention under Article 24(2), we submit that 
Australia should declare that, if New Zealand becomes party to the Convention, it considers 
the Convention inapplicable to the enforcement of New Zealand judgments in Australia. 
While Article 25 of the draft Convention would leave the Christchurch Agreement 
unaffected,7 a declaration should still be sought to avoid any lingering doubts about the 
scheme it creates.  The declaration could be phrased along the lines of section 5(10) of 
the FJA: ‘This Convention does not apply to a judgment given by a court of New Zealand.’ 
                                                     
5 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on Trans-
Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement, signed 24 July 2008, [2013] ATS 32 
(entered into force 11 October 2013) (‘Christchurch Agreement’). 
6 Christchurch Agreement, signed 24 July 2008, [2013] ATS 32 (entered into force 11 October 2013) 
Preamble paras 4-5. 
7 See Christchurch Agreement, signed 24 July 2008, [2013] ATS 32 (entered into force 11 October 
2013). 
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Questions from the Consultation Paper 
 
Question 1: Problems, benefits and risks of recognition and 
enforcement 
 
Key problem: satisfying the requirement for jurisdiction in the international 
sense 
 
The kinds of dispute leading to enforcement proceedings in Australia typically involve 
cross-border litigation in the foreign court. The foreign court may have exercised long-arm 
jurisdiction over the defendant.8  
 
The exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by an Australian court is a justifiable foundation for 
res judicata.9 The same cannot be said for most foreign judgments.10 Recognition and 
enforcement depends on the foreign court having exercised jurisdiction ‘in an international 
sense’, which requires the defendant’s presence in the foreign court’s territorial jurisdiction 
or submission to the foreign court.11   
 
For example, in Lucasfilm Limited v Ainsworth, the English Court of Appeal considered 
enforcement of a United States (‘US’) judgment where the judgment debtor was not 
present in the US jurisdiction and had not submitted to the US court.12 The judgment 
debtor was responsible for a website, which made IP-infringing products available for sale 
in the US. This did not satisfy the requirements for jurisdiction in the international sense. 
The Court upheld the primary judge’s refusal to enforce the US judgment.13  
 
Against that backdrop, the expanded grounds for jurisdiction in art 5(1) of the draft 
Convention are commendable.  
                                                     
8 Pursuant, perhaps, to rules analogous to pt 11 and sch 6 to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 
(NSW). 
9 It was recently observed that ‘[l]itigation between residents of different states is a routine incident 
of modern commercial life’: Abela v Baadarani [2013] 1 WLR 2043, 2062 [53] (Lord Sumption). 
10 Cf Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth).  
11 Contra Independent Trustee Services Ltd v Morris [2010] NSWSC 1218 (20 October 2010).  
12 [2010] Ch 503. 
13 See Lucasfilm Limited v Ainsworth [2010] Ch 503, 551–3 [187]–[195].  
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Practical problem: finding information 
 
One of the authors acted on a matter where the client was interested in whether an 
Australian judgment could be recognised or enforced in a certain foreign jurisdiction. This 
required consideration of the private international law applicable in that jurisdiction. 
Ideally, this kind of problem would be considered by a person with expertise in respect of 
that foreign jurisdiction; that was not possible here due to costs and time constraints. So 
the author sought to get across ‘foreign’ private international law. The author did not have 
access to the legal research resources that are readily available in respect of Australian 
private international law. Had the foreign jurisdiction been party to something like the 
draft Convention, the author’s task would have been much easier. It would have saved 
the Australian client time and money.  
 
Benefits and risks 
 
As the Public Consultation Paper recognises, for an Australian party to cross-border 
litigation who obtains the benefit of an Australian judgment, the recognition and 
enforcement of that judgment abroad will benefit that party by providing a pathway to 
obtaining meaningful relief. 14   The draft Convention provides a clearer pathway for 
Australian judgment creditors to access the assets of judgment debtors in the jurisdictions 
in which those assets are located.  
 
The risk for an Australian party contesting the recognition or enforcement of a foreign 
judgment in Australia is that the foreign judgment is less favourable than an Australian 
judgment would have been had an Australian court determined the same dispute. This risk 
is of the essence in private international law.  It is well established that though Australian 
law would have produced a different result to the law of the relevant foreign jurisdiction 
that is not in itself sufficient to establish that registration or enforcement would be contrary 
to public policy.15 This risk may be tolerable on utilitarian grounds; the society of nations 
will work better if foreign judgments are enforceable in countries where the defendant or 
the defendant’s assets are located.16 
 
Another risk for Australian parties arises where a foreign judgment is recognised or 
enforced overseas, in a third jurisdiction. To illustrate, consider a judgment by a court of 
State X, in respect of an Australian judgment debtor; the judgment creditor then seeks to 
                                                     
14 Public Consultation Paper, 7 [1.3]. 
15 Kok v Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd [2017] WASCA 150 (14 August 2017) [5] (Martin CJ); 
Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New York, 120 NE 198, 201-2 [5] (Cardozo J) (NY, 1918). 
16 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 552 (Slade LJ). 
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enforce the judgment in State Y. The courts of State Y may take an approach to the 
grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement which is distinguishable from the 
approach of Australian courts. The permissive language of Article 7 of the draft Convention 
(‘may be refused’)17 means that this risk may materialise. 
 
For example, some courts may take a different view on the scope of the ‘public policy’ 
defence in Article 7(1)(c).  Australian courts are distinctly reluctant to entertain arguments 
on the basis of public policy,18 but if they were to entertain a public policy argument it 
would be the public policy of Australia.  Naturally, given that the ground refers to the 
public policy of the requested State it is quite possible that a judgment made in State X 
might be recognised and enforced in Australia, but the same judgment may be refused 
recognition in State Y where the courts consider it to be manifestly incompatible with Y’s 
public policy.19 That is the inevitable consequence of the assertion of individual national 
sovereignty that this ground permits. 
 
Question 2: Issues and inconsistencies with current foreign 
judgment regimes in Australia and abroad 
 
Issue: differing approaches to jurisdiction 
 
Even within common law countries, different regimes for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments take different approaches to the requirement for the foreign court to 
have exercised jurisdiction in an international sense. 
 
In Canada, for example, the Supreme Court held that ‘it is reasonable that a domestic 
court recognize and enforce a foreign judgment where the foreign court assumed 
jurisdiction on the same basis as the domestic court would, for example, on the basis of a 
“real and substantial connection” test’.20 This is consistent with Denning LJ’s suggestion 
                                                     
17 See Public Consultation Paper, 19 [4.12]. 
18 Jenton v Overseas Investment Pty Ltd v Townsing (2008) 21 VR 241, 246 [20] (Whelan J); Federal 
Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport v Spirits International BV [No 3] (2013) 300 ALR 741, 
750 [44] (Edmonds J); Kok v Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd [2017] WASCA 150 (14 August 2017) 
[17] (Martin CJ). 
19 Similarly, an Australian court might deny enforcement of a judgment with reference to the 
prohibition on misleading or deceptive conduct in s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’); 
however, the courts of State Y are less likely to afford the ACL extraterritorial effect. See generally 
Valve Corporation v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2018] HCASL 99 (19 April 
2018); Valve Corporation v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 351 ALR 584; 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation [No 3] (2016) 337 ALR 647 
(Edelman J); cf Stern v National Australia Bank [1999] FCA 1421 (15 October 1999). 
20 Beals v Saldanha [2003] 3 SCR 416, 438 [29] (Major J). 
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that reciprocity be the basis for jurisdiction in recognising and enforcing foreign 
judgments.21 
 
Issue: differing approaches to the fixed sum rule and enforcement in equity 
 
Canadian courts have taken a different approach to the so-called ‘fixed sum rule’. In Pro 
Swing Inc v Elta Golf Inc,22 the Canadian Supreme Court held that this traditional rule 
should be changed, observing: 
 
For present purposes, it is sufficient to underscore the need to incorporate the very flexibility 
that infuses equity. However, the conditions for recognition and enforcement can be 
expressed generally as follows: the judgment must have been rendered by a court of 
competent jurisdiction and must be final, and it must be of a nature that the principle of 
comity requires the domestic court to enforce. Comity does not require receiving courts to 
extend greater judicial assistance to foreign litigants than it does to its own litigants, and 
the discretion that underlies equitable orders can be exercised by Canadian courts when 
deciding whether or not to enforce one.23 
 
In Australia, some support can be found allowing: 
 Certain non-money foreign judgments to be recognised in equity;24 and  
 Australian courts to exercise their inherent jurisdiction to freeze assets (via a 
Mareva order) to protect a prospective judgment of a foreign court.25 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of non-money judgments in equity,26 
the draft Convention is to be welcomed. 
 
Issue: enforceability of ‘global injunctions’ 
 
There has been a recent uptake in litigation where plaintiffs seek injunctions to have 
content removed from the internet. Although these orders operate in personam, they are 
directed towards conduct occurring outside of the jurisdiction and often depend on action 
by persons located outside of the jurisdiction. For example, in X v Twitter Inc, the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales enjoined the American and Irish companies behind Twitter to 
                                                     
21 Re Dulles’ Settlement [No 2] [1951] Ch 842, 851. 
22 [2006] 2 SCR 612. 
23 Pro Swing Inc v Elta Golf Inc [2006] 2 SCR 612, 633 [31] (Deschamps J). 
24 White v Verkouille [1990] 2 Qd R 191. 
25 See, eg, BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd v PT Bayan Resources TBK [No 3] [2013] WASC 239 (26 June 
2013). 
26 See further R W White, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Equity’ (1982) 9 Sydney Law Review 
630; Kim Pham, ‘Enforcement of Non-Monetary Foreign Judgments in Australia’ (2008) 30 Sydney 
Law Review 663. 
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remove content from the platform to protect the plaintiff’s confidential information.27 That 
is, the global injunction was the remedy for a breach of confidence.  
 
These kinds of injunctions are likely to be met with hostility in certain foreign jurisdictions, 
as recently demonstrated by the Google-Equustek litigation.28 In Google Inc v Equustek 
Solutions Inc, the Supreme Court of Canada made an analogous global injunction to 
restrain breach of confidence, compelling Google to de-index websites from its search 
results.29 Soon after, Google went forum shopping to California, where it sought a kind of 
post hoc anti-suit injunction. It brought a motion ‘for preliminary injunctive relief’ to 
prevent enforcement of the global injunction upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. In 
November 2017, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
upheld Google’s motion, holding that the Canadian order was likely inconsistent with US 
law.30 
 
Even where intellectual property, privacy and defamation are not the subject matter of a 
‘global injunction’, there is a risk that these orders will be treated with hostility in foreign 
jurisdictions, denying successful Australian plaintiffs meaningful relief. 
 
Question 3: Scope of draft Convention 
 
We endorse the scope of the draft Convention, subject to – 
 Our general submission that, for Australia, the Convention not apply to 
New Zealand judgments;  
 The exclusion (at least for the time being) of privacy / unauthorised 
disclosure of information relating to private life in the proposed Article 
2(1)(l) from the Convention; and 
 Our making no submissions on the inclusion of intellectual property 
judgments. 
 
Most exclusions from the draft Convention’s scope are the same as or closely analogous 
to those exclusions in the FJA. The excluded matters falling within this category include: 
 Matrimonial matters;31 
                                                     
27 [2017] NSWSC 1300 (28 September 2017). 
28 Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc [2017] 1 SCR 824. 
29 [2017] 1 SCR 824. 
30 Google LLC v Equustek Solutions Inc (ND Cal, No 5:17-cv-04207-EJD, 2 November 2017). See 
especially Michael Douglas, ‘A Global Injunction against Google’ (2018) 134 (Apr) Law Quarterly 
Review 181. 
31 See Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 3(1) (definition of ‘action in personam’, para (a)).  
Although note the apparent ability to register annulments or declarations of the validity of marriage 
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 Succession;32 
 Bankruptcy and insolvency of natural persons;33 and 
 Company wind-ups.34 
 
The general effort at incorporating judgments made in all civil and commercial matters is 
welcomed, and should be the natural priority of a broad-based multilateral Convention.  
The express exclusions of Articles 1(1), 2(1) and 2(3) are generally compatible with the 
general coverage of civil and commercial matters.  It is, perhaps, possible to question the 
exclusion of defamation judgments in Article 2(1)(k).  Although the influence of the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation (EU)35 (and its predecessors) in the draft Convention is 
evident, the Brussels I Recast does not exclude defamation judgments.36  However, we 
are conscious of the sensitivity of enforcing defamation judgments and the extraterritorial 
imposition of standards of expression; the use of defamation proceedings to silence 
political dissent or opposition in some countries, and the constitutional difficulties of 
enforcing non-American defamation judgments in the United States.37  We are therefore 
prepared to endorse the exclusion.  Similarly, although the Brussels I Recast includes 
judgments for the violation of privacy rights,38 we consider that the parallel they have with 
defamation judgments justifies the exclusion of judgments concerning privacy / 
unauthorised disclosure of information relating to private life in the proposed Article 
2(1)(l).  It would be best to leave questions of the enforcement of judgments captured by 
Article 2(1)(k) and (l) to a subsequent Convention.    
 
We consider that the exclusion of family law judgments is unexceptional, especially since 
they are already addressed under an extensive scheme of Hague Conventions.39  It 
parallels exclusions under the FJA.40  The exclusion of judgments relating to the status and 
legal capacity of natural persons is also conventional and made under the FJA.41  
                                                     
made in New Zealand under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) ss 4, 67-8; Reid 
Mortensen, Richard Garnett and Mary Keyes, Private International Law in Australia (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2015) 353. 
32 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 3(1) (definition of ‘action in personam’, para (b)). 
33 Ibid s 3(1) (definition of ‘action in personam’, para (c)). 
34 Ibid s 3(1) (definition of ‘action in personam’, para (d)). 
35 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Recast) [2012] OJ L351/1 (‘Recast’). 
36 Case C-68/93, Shevill v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415. 
37 See, eg, Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, 28 
USC §§ 4101-4105 (2010) (the ‘SPEECH Act’). 
38 Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH v X and Martinez v MGN Limited [2011] ECR 
I-10302. 
39 Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 31, 353, 377-8, 393-4, 407-10.  See also the Convention 
on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (the ‘New York Maintenance Convention’).   
40 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 3(1) (definition of ‘action in personam’, para (f). 
41 Ibid s 3(1) (definition of ‘action in personam’, para (e)). 
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Question 4: Bases for recognition and enforcement 
 
We endorse the bases of recognition and enforcement in Article 5 of the 
Convention, and the exclusive bases in Article 6, subject to our making no 
submissions on the inclusion of the proposed Articles 5(3) and 6(a) relating to 
jurisdiction in intellectual property matters. 
 
An underlying assumption of our submission is that, internationally, the rule of law is 
promoted when easing the circulation of judgments made by independent courts that 
exercise legitimate and proportionate jurisdictions, and where concurrent proceedings and 
incompatible judgments can be avoided.  Further, we are conscious that one of the more 
common means of resisting enforcement of a foreign judgment in the requested State is 
to challenge the court of origin’s ‘international jurisdiction’ - ie the competence that the 
law of the requested State recognises that a foreign court must have if its judgments are 
to be enforceable in the requested State.  As the Hague Conference has not been able to 
negotiate a double convention (which deals with both adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction), we recognise that the Convention must still include bases of international 
jurisdiction that are to be satisfied before a judgment is presumed to be enforceable in a 
requested State.  However, we submit that the bases of international jurisdiction in the 
Convention represent a significant improvement on those currently applicable in Australia 
under the FJA or at common law, because – 
 
 In making habitual residence or the principal place of business [Article 5(1)(a)-
(b)] the basis of recognising international jurisdiction over natural persons, the 
Convention actually demands a thicker connection with the State of origin than 
the FJA or the common law demand.42 
 In limiting international jurisdiction in claims against a corporate person to those 
that have concerned ‘the activities’ of that corporate person in the State of origin 
[Article 5(1)(d)], the Convention does not recognise the more exorbitant ‘doing 
business jurisdiction’ that the FJA and the common law do – ie, jurisdiction over 
any person that does business in the State of origin even if the subject matter of 
the claim does not arise there.43  
                                                     
42 ‘Presence’ in the State of origin at the time of service being sufficient at common law: see 
Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 31, 132; and ‘residence’ (not necessarily habitual) being 
sufficient under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 7(3)(a)(iv).  This itself may equate to 
‘presence’: Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 31, 154.   
43 See generally Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 31, 132, 154; Foreign Judgments Act 1991 
(Cth) s 7(3)(a)(iv).   
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 The Convention recognises that, in defined cases, a connection that the subject 
matter of the claim has with the State of origin is itself sufficient for the recognition 
of international jurisdiction [Article 5(1)(g)-(k)], even in the absence of any 
personal connection between the defendant and the State of origin.  In actions in 
personam, these are not sufficient under the FJA or at common law, despite 
acceptance since the nineteenth century that a State has a legitimate interest in 
exercising adjudicative jurisdiction where there is a connection between the 
subject matter of a claim and the State.  These nevertheless avoid recognising the 
exorbitant jurisdictions that arise where a connection merely serves as a proxy for 
the claimant’s residence in the State of origin, such as the ‘damage suffered wholly 
or in part’ of the State head of jurisdiction that is often claimed as a basis of 
adjudicative jurisdiction in Australia.44     
 In a federation or composite nation, the international jurisdiction of a court of a 
‘territorial unit’ – such as a state in a federation – is only recognised if the habitual 
residence, principal place of business or connection is with the territorial unit itself, 
and not just with the nation as a whole (Article 24).  The Convention therefore – 
in our view correctly – regards the kinds of jurisdiction now being promoted in 
Australia under the Harmonised Rules as exorbitant.  Eg, the NSW Supreme 
Court’s assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction in matters relating to any tort that 
occurs anywhere in Australia as a whole45 would not give rise to an enforceable 
judgment under the Convention – unless the act or omission giving rise to the 
judgment occurred in NSW itself [Article 5(1)(j)].          
 
The FJA is based on the legislative model established by the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Act 1933 (UK), which has been influential throughout the Commonwealth 
and serves as the basis of enforcement of Australian judgments in many other 
Commonwealth countries – including the United Kingdom, some Canadian provinces and 
Singapore.  As Table 1 shows, the Convention positions international jurisdiction differently 
to the Commonwealth scheme, requiring thicker personal connections for international 
jurisdiction but allowing subject matter connections that the Commonwealth scheme does 
not.  It follows that, if the Convention were to replace any of the bilateral reciprocal 
enforcement of judgments arrangements that Australia gives effect to under the FJA, some 
Australian judgments that are currently enforceable extraterritorially under the 
Commonwealth scheme would no longer be enforceable.  However, a larger range of 
judgments that rest on the connection of the subject matter with Australia, or an Australian 
                                                     
44 See especially Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 31, 62-4.   
45 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Sch 6 (a)(i). See generally Michael Douglas and 
Vivienne Bath, ‘A New Approach to Service Outside the Jurisdiction and Outside Australia under the 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules’ (2017) 44(2) Australian Bar Review 160.   
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state or territory, would be.  In general, we consider the enforcement jurisdiction that is 
available under the Convention to be more proportionate and adapted to contemporary 
litigation than those recognised under the Commonwealth scheme.    
 
In addition, the more that (outside Australia and New Zealand) Australian courts’ 
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction were to rest on the Convention, the less incentive 
litigants would have to invoke the exorbitant adjudicative jurisdictions that have been 
growing in Australia since the 1970s.  In our view, this would be a welcome development. 
 
As the Convention is structured to deal with jurisdiction indirectly, it can do little to 
discourage concurrent proceedings in different countries.  It therefore can do little to 
prevent the rendering of potentially incompatible judgments by courts that, under Article 
5, would be exercising recognised international jurisdictions.  We nevertheless submit that 
incompatible judgments are dealt with effectively under Article 7 (see Question 5). 
 
Question 5: Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement 
 
We endorse the grounds in Article 7 on which recognition and enforcement may 
be refused, subject to our making no submissions on the inclusion of the 
proposed Article 7(1)(g) relating to intellectual property judgments. 
 
As Table 2 shows, the seven grounds on which one country may refuse to recognise or 
enforce judgments of another contracting country are largely compatible with the current 
Australian framework set out in the FJA.  We make only two brief observations about these 
grounds, and a more detailed comment about Article 7(1)(b): 
 
 The refusal to enforce a judgment on the ground ‘public policy’ [Article 7(1)(c)] is 
always problematic, given the vagaries of the term and its potential to become ‘a 
very unruly horse’.46  Although one of us (Mortensen) has consistently criticised 
the inclusion of public policy in the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act as a reason for 
refusing enforcement of a New Zealand judgment,47 we all agree that this is a 
sensible inclusion for the draft Convention.  The potential States Parties to the 
Convention cannot be known in advance, and the possibility of Parties that have 
                                                     
46 Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229, 252; 130 ER 294, 303 (Burrough J). 
47 Reid Mortensen, ‘A Trans-Tasman Judicial Area: Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in the Single 
Economic Market’ (2011) 16 Canterbury Law Review 61; Reid Mortensen, ‘Together Alone: 
Integrating the Tasman World’ in Andrew Dickinson, Mary Keyes and Thomas John (eds), Australian 
Private International Law in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 2014) 113. 
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fundamentally different understandings of the basic conceptions of justice cannot 
be dismissed.  The draft Convention’s public policy ground is also properly qualified 
by requiring recognition or enforcement of a judgment to be ‘manifestly 
incompatible’ with the public policy of the requested State, a threshold that is not 
found in either the FJA or the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act.48  The inclusions 
concerning procedural fairness and national security or sovereignty should also 
help to reduce the vagaries of the term.  Finally, we take comfort in the Australian 
courts’ marked unwillingness to accept arguments on the basis of public policy and 
hope that that precedent minimises its use in Australia in any attempt to resist 
enforcement under the Convention.49 
 As mentioned in our submission on Question 4, as a Convention that addresses 
the court of origin’s jurisdiction only indirectly (ie, at enforcement in the requested 
State), there is little that the Convention can offer to prevent incompatible 
judgments arising from different courts that nevertheless deliver judgments 
capable of recognition under Article 5.  However, we submit that Articles 7(1)(e)-
(f) and 7(2) address this issue as well as could be hoped.  In this respect, the draft 
Convention is in marked contrast to the Service and Execution of Process Act and 
the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act which, incomprehensibly, do not deal with 
incompatible judgments at all.  First, as in the FJA,50 the priority given to the 
judgment rendered first (and capable of recognition under the Convention) is an 
important disincentive to pursuing litigation in a different country simply because 
of a litigant’s dissatisfaction with an outcome that has already been determined 
[Article 7(1)(f)].  It reinforces the principle of res judicata in the international 
setting.  Secondly, the principle of res judicata is further reinforced by only 
allowing refusal to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment when pending local 
proceedings began before those that led to the foreign judgment.  Again, this is a 
disincentive to commencing local proceedings merely because of dissatisfaction 
with the foreign judgment – yet, at the same time, it is an incentive to commence 
proceedings in another country and a rush to judgment before the Australian court 
could determine the claim.           
 
  
                                                     
48 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 7(2)(a)(xi); Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 
72(1)(a).  
49 See generally Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 31, 142-3, 157-8.   
50 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 7(2)(b). 
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Issue: treatment of the fraud ground for refusing recognition and enforcement  
 
The carve out for fraud in Article 7(1)(b) of the draft Convention warrants specific 
comment. 
 
Even within Australian law, inconsistent views have been expressed on the kind of fraud 
which would justify a defence to recognition or enforcement at common law. 
 
The controversy is whether extrinsic or intrinsic fraud will suffice for the purposes of a 
fraud defence.51  ‘Extrinsic’ fraud denotes matters which arise out of evidence discovered 
after the foreign judgment was entered.52  ‘Intrinsic’ fraud denotes matters which were 
considered, or should have been considered, by the foreign court in making the foreign 
judgment.  
 
Historically, English courts would consider intrinsic fraud as a basis for resisting 
enforcement of a foreign judgment, effectively holding that a foreign judgment is not res 
judicata on the question of fraud.53  That view has been followed by some Australian 
courts.54 
  
In Keele v Findley,55 Rogers CJ Comm D preferred the contrary view that only extrinsic 
fraud could found a defence. This position has received recent support in Australia.56  
 
The carve out for fraud in Article 7(1)(b) of the draft Convention does not specify the kind 
of fraud which would justify refusal of recognition or enforcement.  This ambiguity might 
well be desirable; it would allow Australian courts to adapt the scope of the fraud defence 
to provide justice in individual cases. 
  
                                                     
51 See Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 31, 139–42.  
52 See Wentworth v Rogers [No 5] (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, 539–9 (Kirby P). 
53 See Doe v Howard [2015] VSC 75 (6 March 2015) [123]. See, eg, Vadala v Lawes (1890) 25 QBD 
310; Re Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933; Syal v Heyward [1948] 2 KB 443.  
54 Norman v Norman [No 2] (1968) 12 FLR 39 (Fox J). See also Yoon v Song (2000) 158 FLR 295. 
55 (1990) 21 NSWLR 444. 
56 Quarter Enterprises Pty Ltd v Allardyce Lumber Company Ltd (2014) 85 NSWLR 404; Doe v 
Howard [2015] VSC 75; arguably, a recent unanimous decision of the High Court is consistent with 
this view: see Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (rec and mgr apptd) [2018] HCA 1 (21 March 
2018) [55] n 77. 
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Question 6: Preliminary questions, damages and costs of 
proceedings 
 
We endorse Articles 8 (dealing with judgments on preliminary questions), 10 
(giving the enforcing court a discretion to refuse recognition and enforcement 
on the basis that the damages awarded do not compensate for actual harm 
suffered), and 15 (stating that security cannot be required against the judgment 
creditor on the sole basis of its connections to a foreign country). 
 
Article 8 states that any ruling by a court on a preliminary matter which is outside the 
scope of the Convention shall not be recognised or enforced under the Convention.  We 
support this exclusion which is consistent with the Australian statutory schemes.57  
 
Relatedly, we endorse Article 9 which makes it clear that a severable part of a judgment 
may be recognised and enforced, where only a part of a judgment is sought to be 
recognised and enforced, or is capable of being recognised and enforced.  This is consistent 
with the current Australian statutory schemes, which enable registration of judgments 
which have been partly satisfied.58 
 
Article 10 gives the receiving court a discretion to refuse to recognise or enforce a 
judgment to the extent that it awards damages that do not compensate the award creditor 
for actual loss or harm suffered. This provision is no doubt intended to enable a court to 
refuse to recognise or enforce a United States judgment imposing treble damages under 
US laws. Article 10 enables the receiving court to refuse recognition of judgments that 
award exemplary or punitive damages.  It will take time for a consensus to emerge 
internationally about the interpretation of this provision; even then, the provision does not 
oblige the receiving court to refuse recognition and enforcement, but merely gives the 
court the discretion to do so.  In our view, this is appropriate and is consistent with the 
current Australian common law, according to which such judgments may be refused 
recognition if the judgment enforces a foreign penal law.59 We particularly consider that 
this provision is appropriate given that the Convention will be a single, rather than a 
double, Convention. 
                                                     
57 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 7(2)(a)(i). 
58 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 6(12), Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) s 70.  See 
also Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) s 71(1) (in relation to registration of judgments 
which are only partly within the scope of the Act). 
59 See generally Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes, above n 31, 226-228. See, eg, Schnabel v Lui [2002] 
NSWSC 15 (1 February 2002); Surgibit IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Ellis [No 2] [2017] NSWSC 1379 (11 
October 2017). 
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Article 15 provides that a party who applies for enforcement under the Convention cannot 
be required to give security, a bond, or a deposit solely on the ground that they are a 
foreign national, or not domiciled or resident in the State in which enforcement of the 
judgment is sought.  This non-discrimination provision is in our view entirely appropriate 
and is consistent with the current Australian law.  It is of course consistent with this 
provision that the enforcing party may be required to give security as long as their lack of 
connection to the enforcing state is not the only reason for requiring the security. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We would welcome an opportunity to expand upon this written submission. 
 
19 
Table 1: Bases for recognition and enforcement in Convention and Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) 
                                                     
60 See Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 7(5) for what does not constitute voluntary submission. 
Draft Convention Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) 
Person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought: Judgment debtor – person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought 
 Habitual residence: Art 5(1)(a)  Residence: s 7(3)(a)(iv) 
 Natural person’s principal place of business: Art 5(1)(b)  Corporation’s principal place of business: s 7(3)(a)(iv) 
 Maintained branch, agency, or other establishment; claim arose out of 
its activities: Art 5(1)(d) 
 Corporation’s principal place of business: s 7(3)(a)(iv) 
 Brought the claim, other than a counterclaim: Art 5(1)(c)  Brought the claim (or counter-claimed in): s 7(3)(a)(iv) 
Defendant: Defendant: 
 Maintained branch, agency, or other establishment; claim arose out of 
its activities: Art 5(1)(d) 
 Transaction effected through or at an office or place of business in 
country of court: s 7(3)(a)(v) 
 Voluntary submission to court’s jurisdiction: Art 5(1)(e)-(f)  Voluntary submission to court’s jurisdiction: s 7(3)(a)(i)60 
Judgment ruled on: Judgment ruled on: 
 Contractual obligation, performance of which occurred in State (per 
parties’ agreement or as applicable law): Art 5(1)(g) 
 Contractual obligation, eg choice of forum clause: s 7(3)(a)(iii) 
 Rights in rem in immovable property situated in state of origin: Art 6(b) 
(exclusive bases for recognition and enforcement) 
 Immovable property or action in rem where subject matter is movable 
property located in country of court: s 7(3)(b) 
 [Registration or validity of intellectual property right granted or 
registered or deemed to have been granted or registered in state of 
origin: Art 5(3)(a)-(c); Art 6(a)] 
 
 Tenancy of immovable property located in state of origin: Art 5(1)(h); 
Art 6(c) (tenancy longer than six months) 
 Immovable property or action in rem where subject matter is movable 
property located in country of court: s 7(3)(b) 
 Contractual obligation secured by right in rem in immovable property: 
Art 5(1)(i) 
McKibbin, Douglas, Keyes, and Mortensen | Submission to the Attorney-General’s Department  
 
 
20 
 
  
 Non-contractual obligation (death, physical injury, damage or loss of 
tangible property); act or omission occurring in state of origin: Art 
5(1)(g) 
 Unclassified proceeding, provided international jurisdiction otherwise 
established: s 7(3)(c) 
 Disputes internal to trust: Art 5(1)(k)  Unclassified proceeding, provided international jurisdiction otherwise 
established: s 7(3)(c) 
 Counterclaim: Art 5(1)(l)  Counterclaim: s 7(3)(a)(iv) 
 Non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses: Art 5(1)(m)  
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Table 2: Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement in Convention and Foreign Judgments Act 
1991 (Cth) 
 
Draft Convention Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) 
 Denial of procedural fairness (ie, notice): Art 7(1)(a)  Denial of procedural fairness (ie, notice): s 7(2)(a)(v) 
 Judgment obtained by fraud: Art 7(1)(b)  Judgment obtained by fraud: s 7(2)(a)(vi) 
 Manifest incompatibility with public policy: Art 7(1)(c)  Contrary to public policy: s 7(2)(a)(xi) 
 Proceedings contrary to choice of court agreement or designation in 
trust instrument: Art 7(1)(d) 
 Absence of jurisdiction: s 7(2)(a)(iv) 
 Inconsistent judgments in requested State: Art 7(1)(e)  Incompatible judgments: s 7(2)(b) 
 Inconsistent judgments in another State: Art 7(1) 
(f) 
 [Rules of infringement of intellectual property right, applying law other 
than internal law of state of origin: Art 7(1)(g)] 
 Immovable proceedings situated outside country of original court: s 
7(4)(a) 
